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SUMMARY
Fuzzing is an effective technique for automatically uncovering bugs in software. Since
it was introduced, it has found thousands of vulnerabilities. Nowadays, fuzzing is an
indispensable tool in security researchers’ arsenal.
Unfortunately, most fuzzing research has been concentrated on Linux systems, and
Windows fuzzing has been largely neglected by the fuzzing community. Windows systems
still represent a large market share of desktop computers, and as they are end-user systems,
they are valuable targets to attackers. Windows fuzzing is still difficult-to-setup, slow, and
generally troublesome. There exists a chicken-egg problem: because Windows fuzzing
is challenging, little effort is invested in it; yet, because little effort is invested, Windows
fuzzing remains challenging. We aim to break this cycle by attacking one of the root
problems blocking easy and effective Windows fuzzing.
A key difference between Linux and Windows systems for fuzzing is the lack of a
fork() functionality on Windows systems. Without a suitable fork() API, a fuzzer cannot
quickly and reliably clone processes, an operation that fuzzing relies heavily upon. Existing
Windows fuzzers such as WinAFL rely on persistent-mode fuzzing as a work-around for the
lack of fast process cloning, unlike Linux fuzzers which rely on a fork-server.
In this work, we developed a fork() implementation that provides the necessary fast
process cloning machinery and built a working fork-server on top of it. We integrated this
fork-server into WinAFL, and applied several other key improvements and insights to bypass
the difficulties of fuzzing typical Windows applications. In our evaluation, we ran our fuzzer
against 59 fuzzing harnesses for 37 applications, and found 61 new bugs. Comparing the
performance of our fork() implementation against other similar APIs on Windows, we found
that our implementation was the most suitable and efficient. We believe that this marks the
first Windows fork implementation suitable for fuzzing.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Software vulnerabilities are a leading cause of computer misuse and exploitation. Vulnera-
bilities are usually caused by simple programming errors or mistakes, called bugs. In the
past few years, the activity of locating bugs, or bug hunting, has become a high-profile
and even lucrative endeavor for computer security professionals. Both the defensive and
offensive computer security communities place great emphasis on bug hunting due to the
potential of new vulnerabilities to enable and unleash serious cyber-attacks. If an attacker
is able to find a previously-unknown bug and weaponize it, millions of computer systems
could be compromised. Likewise, if a defensive security analyst is able to locate and patch
the bug before attackers can exploit it, such an attack would be thwarted. Therefore, the
ability to quickly and efficiently locate bugs is paramount to computer security.
Fuzzing, a technique to automatically find software bugs, has been the focus of a
significant body of recent research. When fuzzing a piece of computer software, random
data is fed into the program as input, and the behavior of the program is closely monitored
for errors or instabilities, such as program crashes or infinite loops (“hangs”). Although the
overall idea dates back to the 1990s [1], fuzzing received increased attention following the
release of the fuzzer American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) in 2013 [2]. Due in large part to AFL’s
practical success in discovering new bugs in well-known, widely-deployed software like
Adobe Flash and Mozilla Firefox, fuzzing thus became a widespread technique employed
by many security researchers.
AFL’s revolutionary success is due to its use of coverage feedback-guided greybox
fuzzing. In this mode of fuzzing, inputs that elicit new, previously-unseen behavior from the
program are prioritized for further mutation in future iterations. Thus, the fuzzer “learns” to
generate meaningful inputs over time that are more likely to trigger software bugs, rather
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Figure 1.1: An overview of the popular fuzzer AFL. (1) The fuzzer maintains a queue of inputs.
Each cycle, (2) it picks one input from the queue and (3) modifies it to generate a new input. (4) It
feeds the new input into the fuzzed program and (5) records the code coverage. (6) If the execution
triggers more coverage, the new input is added back into the queue. Figure reproduced from [8].
than random noise that is easily rejected and does not significantly test the program’s logic.
Several other fuzzers have been developed that also adopt AFL’s principle of coverage-
guided fuzzing. These projects aim to improve on AFL’s shortcomings and include LLVM’s
LibFuzzer [3], Google’s honggFuzz [4], and several others. Nevertheless, AFL’s legacy
remains strong in the research community today: a large amount of research still bases their
work off of AFL as a starting point [5, 6, 7].
Unfortunately, because AFL’s overwhelming popularity has dominated the research
community, most recent research has focused on fuzzing Linux software. AFL was designed
to target programs built for Linux systems [2], and Windows software is not compatible
with Linux. Thus, Windows software, which represents a large portion of the consumer
and desktop software market, has been mostly neglected by the fuzzing community. The
current state-of-the-art for Windows fuzzing research is WinAFL, a port of AFL to Windows
systems [9]. However, WinAFL suffers from several problems, including slow execution
speeds, poor stability, and inaccurate instrumentation for coverage feedback. Moreover,
since most commercial Windows software is closed-source, security researchers must expend
tedious efforts reverse-engineering the software before they are able to fuzz it.
In this thesis, we aim to address these shortcomings by: 1 introducing a new user-
space fork() mechanism to facilitate fast and reliable fuzzing, 2 developing new fuzzing
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techniques to cope with the challenges of fuzzing complex, real-world software, and
3 implementing coverage feedback with “full-speed” instrumentation.
This work was published as part of “WINNIE: Fuzzing Windows Applications with
Harness Synthesis and Fast Cloning” in NDSS’21 [8].
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
Fuzzing, a technique which automatically finds software bugs by testing random inputs
against programs, was first introduced in 1990 by Miller et al [1]. However, the technique
was not popularized until the release of American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) by Michal Zalewski
in 2015 [2]. Since the release of AFL, many researchers have expanded the body of
research surrounding fuzzing. Many other fuzzers have been developed, such as LLVM’s
LibFuzzer [3] and Google’s honggfuzz [4]. In general, the goal of a fuzzer is to find as
many bugs as possible, as quickly as possible. However, today’s fuzzers still miss many
bugs. The large majority of fuzzing research attempts to address this in three main ways:
1 improving the performance of fuzzers, 2 applying fuzzing in a new and interesting
fashion, and 3 fuzzing previously-untested target applications.
2.1 Improving fuzzer performance
The first category of fuzzing research, improving fuzzer performance, has received the most
attention of the three. This category can be broken down into two main sub-categories:
optimizing the fuzzer’s raw performance and optimizing the fuzzer’s input generation
strategy. One technique developed to improve AFL’s performance is full-speed coverage [10].
Under full-speed coverage, basic blocks are instrumented only once, and new code coverage
is only reported when a new basic block is encountered. This is a drastic shift from past
research which emphasized edge coverage and per-run block coverage. Full-speed fuzzing
argues that the trade-off in execution speed over coverage granularity is economical. Another
example of research aimed at improving fuzzer performance is AFLFast [11], which extends
AFL using power schedules to improve its search strategy.
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2.1.1 Improving input generation
The task of optimizing fuzzer input generation has received more attention from the research
community than improving fuzzers’ raw performance. The major breakthroughs in this
area of research so far have been concolic or hybrid fuzzing [12], machine learning-guided
fuzzing [13, 14, 15], multi-dimensional fuzzing [16, 17], and grammar-based fuzzing [18,
19, 20]. Hybrid fuzzing seeks to blend dynamic coverage information that traditional
grey-box fuzzers like AFL rely on with white-box information gleaned from symbolic
execution. These concolic (concrete and symbolic) fuzzers are thus able to solve branches
and conditionals that would otherwise stump unequipped grey-box fuzzers. Machine
learning-assisted fuzzing seeks to improve the fuzzer’s input generation by using neural
networks. Some approaches try to improve the mutation selection strategy [15], while others
try to generate more meaningful inputs by training neural networks to recognize which
inputs are interesting and which are not [13, 14]. Multi-dimensional fuzzing targets complex
applications, like filesystems, by expanding the definition of “input” past files to also include
holistic information about the execution environment such as API call sequences and thread
scheduling order [16, 17]. Grammar-based fuzzing is a well-known fuzzing technique which
generates inputs using grammar specifications to guarantee that inputs are well-formed [19].
They are typically used to tackle the challenge of fuzzing language parsers, such as C
compilers [18] or Javascript interpreters [20].
2.2 Novel applications of fuzzing
The second main research direction, applying fuzzing in new ways or to new domains,
is arguably the most diverse of the three categories. Researchers have noted that fuzzing
can be modeled as a state-space exploration problem. Following this line of reasoning,
some researchers have even used AFL to play Super Mario [21]. By doing so, they showed
that fuzzing can have novel and interesting applications not just in the narrow realm of
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computer security. Google created ClusterFuzz [22], an attempt to massively scale AFL
up by leveraging Google’s enormous compute power. ClusterFuzz backs the OSS-Fuzz
project which helps find bugs in open-source software [23, 24]. Running AFL at such large
scales presents its own set of interesting challenges and rewards. Lastly, Fuzzcoin [25]
is a new exciting project that aims to match Cluster-fuzz in computing power parity by
crowdsourcing computing power to commodity hardware owned by ordinary consumers.
2.3 Exploring new fuzzing targets
The last main category of fuzzing research aims to bring fuzzing to new targets that have
not been thoroughly fuzz tested before. One shining example of research in this direction is
Syzkaller [7]. While AFL is designed to fuzz Linux user-mode applications, Syzkaller was
the first fuzzer to prove that kernel fuzzing is viable. It fuzzed the kernel by making random
Linux system calls, in the hopes of triggering a crash or hang. Since Syzkaller, kAFL [6] has
also tried to address the kernel fuzzing problem. kAFL improves on Syzkaller by improving
the fuzzer’s coverage feedback. Using Intel PT instrumentation, they improved the fuzzer by
leveraging innovative hardware features. Meanwhile, FuzzGen [26] and FUDGE [27] aim
to fuzz new targets by generating fuzzing harnesses based on static analysis of code which
uses the fuzzed libraries. Lastly, WinAFL [9] attempts to address Windows applications,
whereas previous research had focused on Linux applications.
Extending fuzzing to new targets is important because it allows security researchers
to test and correct bugs in code that has never been fuzz tested before. Fuzzing is a
phenomenally successful technique that has found bugs in virtually every code-base that it
has been applied against. Fuzzing has even found bugs in formally-verified code [17]. Until
code has been fuzz tested, it is overwhelmingly likely that there are bugs or edge-cases that
the programmer has forgotten to consider, which would have otherwise been quickly rooted
out by fuzzing.
This research aims to bring fuzzing to closed-source Windows binaries, many of which
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have never been fuzz tested before. These applications represent a vast portion of the
consumer desktop application market and have millions of users. For example, since Adobe
Photoshop is closed-source, it is likely that no one has ever fuzzed it because closed-source
Windows applications are very difficult to fuzz. Our aim is to bring fuzzing to popular
commercial applications like Photoshop and eliminate the “low-hanging fruit” that attackers
would exploit to compromise end-user systems.
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CHAPTER 3
TOWARDS A PRACTICAL WINDOWS FUZZER
Windows closed-source applications pose two major challenges for fuzzing. First, they
are difficult to instrument. Second, many of them behave problematically—for example:
complex initialization code, self-termination, and file handle leaks all hinder fuzzing. To mit-
igate these problems, we propose a new Windows fuzzer that uses an injected fuzzing agent.
Our fuzzer consists of two main components: the fuzzing engine, and the injected fuzzing
agent. The fuzzing engine is responsible for processing code coverage information, updating
coverage maps, and generating new inputs via mutation. The fuzzing agent performs the
low-level work required to collect code coverage and also deals with various runtime issues
that may arise in the target application, which we elaborate on below. To coordinate and
communicate with the fuzzing engine, the agent uses a bidirectional pipe. This design
enables the fuzzing agent to perform its work directly within the target application while
also neatly separating the fuzzers’ mutation and instrumentation functionality.
To implement our fuzzer, we build on top of WinAFL, a port of AFL for Windows
systems. We offer three key improvements over WinAFL, which we expand on below: 1 we
introduce a new implementation of fork() suitable for high-speed Windows application
fuzzing (§3.1); 2 we provide fuzzing techniques that overcome the challenges of fuzzing
real-world, commercial software (§3.2); and 3 we adopt modern instrumentation methods,
sidestepping hurdles caused by existing methods (§3.3). These improvements combined
significantly improve the applicability, practicality, and performance of Windows fuzzing.
In the following sections, we will discuss each of these contributions in further detail.
8
hit new BB,
or actual crash
agent.dll
(forkserver)
❺ status,
exec cmd
Entry Point
Fuzzing target
NtCreateFile, 
TerminateProc
❷ install
function hook
Target Program
Custom 
exception handler
PIPE
❻ new cov,
crash
❹ forked processes
...fork
update 
coveragefuzzing input
❸ instrument BBs
Mutator Selector Queue Monitor
❶ inject
agent
Figure 3.1: Overview of our fuzzer. We inject a fuzzing agent into the target. The injected agent
spawns the fork-server, instruments basic blocks, and hooks several functions. This improves
performance and sidesteps various instrumentation issues. Figure reproduced from [8].
3.1 Fork on Windows
Contemporary fuzzers such as AFL [2] adopt a fork-server architecture, which is extremely
useful for fuzzing. When fuzzing under a fork-server, the fuzzed application runs normally
until right before the input is read and processed. At this point, the application enters
the fork-server, which spawns pre-initialized processes on-demand. Each forked child
process executes a single input, and the fuzzer records the execution’s outcome. The benefit
of using a fork-server is two-fold: first, it improves performance by avoiding costly re-
executions, and second, it improves stability by isolating the effects of an execution to a
single process. Without a fork server, the fuzzer wastes a significant amount of time on
irrelevant initialization code, as the program must be re-executed from scratch for each
input.
One solution to avoid slow re-executions is to use persistent-mode fuzzing [9, 28, 29],
in which multiple inputs are executed in the same fully-initialized process. However, this
harms stability: unless the fuzzing target function is perfectly pure (i.e., without side-
effects), differences in the program state will gradually accumulate across many executions,
eventually leading to divergence. However, for Windows applications, most target functions
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Figure 3.2: Execution timeline for a complex Windows application. The startup and program
initialization often dominate execution times of Windows applications when fuzzing. Before reaching
any parsing logic, an application must first run uninteresting initialization code, including GUI setup.
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Figure 3.3: Cost of re-execution when fuzzing. Effective fuzzing campaigns require thousands
or millions of repeated executions. As shown, frequent re-executions severely degrade fuzzing
performance. Hence, it is crucial to minimize re-executions by the fuzzer.
have side-effects. For example, an application may handle errors by simply terminating itself.
Thus, reliance on persistent mode severely limits the applicability of fuzzing. Meanwhile,
using a fork-server avoids this problem altogether. Because each input is executed in a
separate process, any possible side-effects that can obstruct fuzzing are safely contained,
such as timeouts, crashes, and hangs. This greatly improves the stability and scalability of
fuzzing. Nevertheless, existing Windows fuzzers cannot use a fork-server. Overall, having a
fork-server is extremely beneficial to fuzzing, but depends on the existence of a fork() API.
Unfortunately, the Windows kernel does not expose a fork() API suitable for fuzzing.
Thus, this work sets out to implement such process cloning machinery to aid Windows
fuzzing. To clone a process, all data structures and memory owned by the process must be
duplicated, including page contents, page tables, file descriptor tables, etc. It is possible to
crudely approximate this behavior manually [30]; however, this approach has serious flaws.
Not only is manual process cloning unreliable, it is also slow. We will elaborate on both
these issues below.
First, manual process cloning is unreliable. The kernel maintains more information
about processes than is accessible from user space: for example, references to kernel objects.
It would not be possible to faithfully recreate these aspects of the program state, leading
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to incorrect behavior or corruption. In general, operating systems are designed so that the
kernel is the one responsible for loading and running processes; manually cloning processes
would require making many assumptions about the cloned process. However, we cannot
afford to make assumptions about our fuzzed application: recall that our goal is to fuzz
commercial, off-the-shelf Windows software. Thus, to expand the applicability of fuzzing,
we need a process cloning mechanism that is native to the Windows kernel.
Second, manual process cloning is slow. Modern operating systems that expose fork()
do so using a technique called Copy-on-Write (CoW) [31]. When a process is cloned as
CoW, only the bare-bones data structures holding process metadata are copied, such as page
tables and process list entries. The actual full memory contents of the process are not copied
when fork() is called. Instead, both processes share the same memory pages until one of
them writes to a page. Thus, only the pages that are modified by the forked child process
are copied, greatly improving performance. Since successful fuzzing campaigns involve
millions of executions, a high-speed fork implementation is crucial to the scalability of
fuzzing. For a heavy application (for example, with memory footprint >50MB), a manual
process cloning method would have to copy all process memory each execution, seriously
degrading performance. Thus, we need a fork implementation that is also Copy-on-Write.
In short, we need a fork implementation that is both native to the Windows kernel and
also Copy-on-Write (CoW). To create our fork() implementation, we reverse-engineered
several undocumented Windows APIs and subsystems. We extracted several key func-
tionalities that are required to create a stable fork() implementation suitable for Windows
fuzzing. Namely, we analyzed the function CreateUserProcess in ntdll and the CSRSS
(Client/Server Runtime Subsystem) and found several key magic values that they require.
This API is an undocumented, but first-party API that is exposed directly by the kernel to
ordinary user programs, and it accurately clones processes. To implement the CoW fork
functionality, we call NtCreateUserProcess with a NULL section handle argument. This
satisfies both of the requirements outlined above.
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Figure 3.4: Overview of fork() on Windows. We analyzed various Windows APIs and services to
achieve a CoW fork() functionality suitable for fuzzing. Fixing up the CSRSS is essential for fuzzing
COTS Windows applications: if the CSRSS is not re-initialized, the child process will crash when
accessing Win32 APIs. Figure reproduced from [8].
Next, whenever we fork a new child process, we must connect it to the CSRSS so
that it may function properly. The CSRSS is a user-mode daemon which manages several
underlying Windows components, such as console Windows. Newly-created processes
must be connected to the CSRSS to work properly. Otherwise, operations like opening or
saving a file may lead to a crash. Connecting to the CSRSS is normally done by Windows
automatically, but we must do this ourselves. We begin by calling CsrClientCallServer in
the parent process with message BasepCreateProcess. Next, because the child process was
forked from a fully-initialized parent process, several variables in the child’s address space
in ntdll, such as CsrServerApiRoutine, must be de-initialized. Lastly, the child process
calls CsrClientConnectToServer. These steps connect a newly-forked child process to the
CSRSS and allow it to behave normally.
We tested the fork implementation for the following properties: 1 robustness, 2 speed,
and 3 copy-on-write. To test the fork implementation’s robustness, we created several
simple programs that perform basic operations such as file I/O, printing console output,
etc. We then forked these programs before the behavior and validated that they worked
correctly in the child process. We also tested that global state was preserved properly during
forking, by checking the value of a global counter variable that we incremented before
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forking each time. To test the fork implementation’s speed, we measured how quickly the
fork implementation could run in executions per second. Lastly, to verify that the fork
implementation was indeed Copy-on-Write (CoW), we compared the time taken to fork a
process with large and small memory footprints and ensured they were similar.
3.2 Fuzzing Commercial Windows Applications
Next, we will describe how our fuzzer mitigates problematic behaviors common in commer-
cial, off-the-shelf (COTS) Windows applications. To fuzz an application, the fuzzer needs to
be able to easily call the target functionality repeatedly and automatically. For example, to
fuzz a PDF reader, the fuzzer needs to be able to call the reader’s PDF parsing functions in
the fuzzing loop. For command-line (CLI) applications, this is simple: the fuzzer can simply
re-run the program each time, passing the fuzzing input file as an argument or via standard
input. However, many popular Windows applications only expose GUIs (graphical user
interfaces), and it is much more difficult to fuzz GUI applications as they cannot be easily
automated. Although it is possible to directly simulate keyboard and mouse inputs [32], this
is slow and not scalable. A good fuzzer should run at speeds of at least 100 execs/sec, but
using automation tools would limit speeds to less than 3 exec/sec. Thus, we need a way to
bypass the GUIs obstructing the functionality we wish to fuzz.
One popular method to fuzz GUI applications is to create a fuzzing harness. A fuzzing
harness essentially converts a GUI application into a CLI application and acts like an adaptor.
The harness exposes a convenient command-line interface directly to the functionality we
wish to fuzz. However, creating fuzzing harnesses is a challenging problem even for first-
party, open-source software [27, 26]. For us, the situation is even more dire: we wish to fuzz
third-party, commercial software. It is very difficult to create accurate fuzzing harnesses for
COTS Windows software, and most of them are not designed to be fuzzed. We will now
discuss the specific reasons as to why harness generation is challenging.
The ultimate source of the difficulty is that the problem of accurately extracting code
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fragments from binary applications is fundamentally hard. The harness generation problem
at its core boils down to a code extraction problem: the fuzzing harness must selectively
extract necessary driver code for calling the target functionality, while excluding irrelevant
GUI code. For example, Windows applications often have a lot of initialization and setup
code, which must all be faithfully reproduced in a fuzzing harness, making generating
valid harnesses difficult. Another serious obstacle for harness synthesis is the existence
of call-back functions [33, 34]. Call-back functions are interface bindings provided to the
fuzzed code that the harness must also reimplement accurately. Overall, the underlying
code extraction problem is not just difficult; in general, it is undecidable. Notwithstanding
theoretical concerns, in practice most simple cases can still be solved heuristically. Therefore,
to expand the scope of fuzzing to commercial, off-the-shelf Windows applications, we need
a way to simplify and reduce the harness generation problem to minimize the amount of
code that must be extracted.
We propose a technique, the injected fork-server, that obviates complex harness synthesis.
Rather than trying to completely extract all of the setup or call-back behavior, we simply
run the application binary itself. The fuzzing agent is injected as soon as the program
loads, before any application code has begun executing. Once injected, the fuzzing agent
first hooks a function specified by the harness, and promptly returns control to the target
application. Then, the target application is allowed to initialize itself. Once the hook is
called, the application is halted and the fuzzing agent spins up the fork-server. In our
experience, this technique resolves many problems caused by difficult-to-extract setup code.
Meanwhile, since we spin up the fork-server only at some point deep within the program,
this massively improves performance because the initialization code only runs once.
Windows applications also exhibit a myriad of miscellaneous problems that impede
fuzzing efforts. These problems typically manifest during harness generation. Our fuzzer
employs several strategies to mitigate these issues:
Surviving Process Termination. Many applications implement error handling by simply
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Figure 3.5: Injected fork-server technique. The target program is started normally and allowed to
self-initialize. We place a hook immediately after the initialization code, before the program begins
its main functionality (e.g., a GUI). We then hijack and redirect the control flow to our fuzzing loop.
terminating the program. Because most inputs generated during fuzzing are invalid, this
would demand constant re-executions from scratch, severely degrading performance. Our
fuzzer sidesteps this problem, since we can readily spawn pre-initialized child processes
thanks to our new implementation of fork() (see §3.1).
Sharing the input file. Since the fuzzer must be able to overwrite the input file for each
iteration, the input file must be opened non-exclusively. To resolve the issue, we hook the
function NtCreateFile, a sink for file-related operations. By hooking the function, we can
check whether the file being opened is the input file, and if so, add the write-sharing flag
to the parameters before resuming. This solves the common issue of the target application
locking the file, blocking the fuzzer.
Resolving Self-unpacking Code. Our fuzzer supports binaries which employ self-
unpacking code as an anti-reverse-engineering tactic. We do so by employing guard
pages, which are similar to memory breakpoints. By setting the target function’s page
protection to be inaccessible, our exception handler is notified whenever it is accessed by the
target application. We do not install our instrumentation hooks until the target application
begins executing that page; e.g., after it has finished unpacking itself. This deals with
self-unpacking code in an elegant and target-agnostic fashion.
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3.3 Improved Instrumentation
Effective fuzzing relies on the availability of practical, reliable program instrumentation
to profile the fuzzed program’s runtime execution. Existing Windows instrumentation
solutions and fuzzers suffer from serious stability and performance penalties. DynamoRIO
suffers from reliability issues and is prone to crashes when fuzzing with WinAFL [35, 36].
WinAFL relies on the debug API. Using the debug API frequently causes errors, since many
applications do not behave normally when they detect they are under a debugger. This
is especially true when the target application uses software protection mechanisms (e.g.,
third-party packers or obfuscators [37, 38]). Generally speaking, these external solutions
are often unwieldy and unreliable. Instead, we propose an internal solution by injecting the
fuzzing functionality directly into the target program. We integrate the fork-server, binary
instrumentation, and exception handling code into one library, the fuzzing agent, which is
forcibly loaded into the target application at startup. Because it can perform its work directly
inside the target application’s process address space, the fuzzing agent avoids using any
debug APIs and can instrument the binary more effectively.
To collect coverage, we use fullspeed fuzzing [10] and a custom exception handler
in place of the problematic debug API. Fullspeed fuzzing collects boolean basic block
coverage, meaning that new coverage is only reported when new basic blocks are reached.
To be precise, each basic block receives a single-shot breakpoint, which yields control to
the fuzzing agent when reached. The fuzzing agent then records coverage information
before removing the breakpoint. Thus, the breakpoint is excluded from any future runs.
When the basic block is reached during subsequent executions, it is un-instrumented and
execution proceeds uninterrupted. Thus, since new coverage is rare, the target application
runs nearly at native speed during fuzzing. Moreover, breakpoints need only be installed
once thanks to the fork-server: child processes inherit the same set of breakpoints as the
parent. Since applications may easily contain as many as 100,000 basic blocks, this is a
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crucial optimization as instrumenting all of the basic blocks takes a considerable amount of
initialization time.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATION
To evaluate our fuzzer, we conducted end-to-end experiments on real-world applications
as well as individual experiments on our Windows fork implementation. The end-to-end
experiments were run on Intel Xeon E5-2670 v3 CPUs, and the fork implementation tests
we run on an Intel i7-7700 CPU.
In our end-to-end evaluation [8], we constructed 59 fuzzing harnesses for 37 applications.
We were able to fuzz all of these harnesses using our fuzzer, and we found 61 vulnerabilities
from 32 binaries across 16 applications. WinAFL in Intel PT mode failed to run 33 out of
the 59 harnesses; WinAFL in DynamoRIO mode failed to run 30 of the 59 harnesses. We
chose 6 harnesses that WinAFL was able to run for an in-depth side-by-side comparison.
In 4 of those 6 harnesses, we noticed major issues such as memory or handle leaks, or
unacceptably slow performance (i.e., < 1.0 executions/second). On those 6 harnesses, our
fuzzer improved raw fuzzing speed by 31.3x and coverage by 4.0x on average. Thus, our
fuzzer significantly expands the scope, efficacy, and practicality of Windows fuzzing.
We compared several process spawning and cloning APIs against our new fork() im-
plementation. The closest comparison in terms of functionality would be Cygwin’s fork()
implementation; nevertheless, we also included CreateProcess, the Windows Subsystem
on Linux (WSL)’s fork implementation, and finally Linux’s native fork.
We compared our fork implementation against a similar mechanism from the Cygwin
project which also provides process cloning functionality. In terms of speed, our fork
implementation achieved speeds of around 300 forked processes per second, whereas
Cygwin achieved only 72.8. Unlike Cygwin, our implementation is Copy-on-Write (CoW),
and also directly supported by the kernel. These factors contribute to our implementation’s
improved performance. As discussed in §3.1, manual fork implementations like Cygwin’s
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are undesirable for fuzzing purposes. In short, manual process cloning methods scale poorly
as they are not CoW. They are also less versatile because they are not directly supported by
the operating system and can only perform user-mode operations. Hence, in summary, our
fork implementation outperforms Cygwin’s in terms of both speed and versatility.
We compared our fork implementation against process spawning APIs. CreateProcess
is the standard Windows function used to spawn new processes with a default program
state. In terms of speed, CreateProcess achieves speeds of roughly 100 new processes
per second. This is slower than our fork implementation because the operating system
must allocate, prepare, and initialize an entire new process for each CreateProcess call.
Considering the complicated steps required to properly load a Windows executable (dynamic
linking, resolving relocations, etc.), this incurs a heavy overhead. On the other hand, forking
a pre-initialized process with CoW is simple: all that must be copied are auxiliary data
structures such as page tables and file descriptor lists. Unlike APIs that spawn new processes
such as CreateProcess, our fork implementation clones existing processes. As discussed in
§3.1, this difference is paramount for fuzzing. The ability to quickly clone pre-initialized
processes enables fuzzers to cleanly and efficiently re-execute the target functionality across
many different inputs. Thus, not only does our fork implementation outperform creating
new processes from scratch, it also provides essential functionality for Windows fuzzing.
We compared our fork implementation against the one used by the Windows Subsystem
for Linux (WSL). The Windows Subsystem for Linux is a syscall translation layer that allows
Windows systems to run Linux binaries directly, roughly the opposite effect of projects
like WINE [39, 40]. As a POSIX implementation, WSL features a fully-functional fork
implementation. WSL’s fork outperforms ours in terms of raw speed, achieving about 400
forked processes per second, whereas ours achieved only 300. Internally, WSL leverages
similar kernel functions as our fork implementation to direct the kernel to clone a user-
space process [41], leading to roughly comparable speeds. However, WSL achieves better
speeds because it can make more assumptions about the processes to be forked; namely,
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they are special WSL processes, which are like a subclass of general Windows processes.
Nevertheless, WSL’s fork implementation is incompatible with Windows fuzzing. WSL is
designed only to run native Linux ELF binaries, whereas our goal is to fuzz typical Windows
PE binaries. Overall, our fork implementation enjoys speeds comparable to WSL’s fork
implementation but supports native Windows applications instead.
Lastly, we compared our fork implementation against Linux’s native fork implementation.
For process creation, Linux greatly outperforms Windows in terms of raw speed: Linux’s
fork implementation could prepare 5,000 forked processes per second, whereas ours could
only prepare 300. There is little we can do about this problem. The Linux kernel hosts a
completely different operating system and is architected differently from the Windows NT
kernel. It could be that the Linux process creation process is simpler or more efficient than
its counterpart on Windows, or both. In any case, although it may be more efficient to fuzz
cross-platform applications using their Linux version, many popular applications are limited
to Windows platforms only. Thus, albeit imperfect, our fork implementation fills the gap
on Windows systems and fulfills the need for a Windows fork implementation suitable for
fuzzing purposes.
Our fork implementation has a few idiosyncrasies that must be taken into account, pri-
marily due to the design of the Windows operating system. Similar to its Linux counterpart,
if a multi-threaded program calls fork(), only the calling thread is cloned. Also similar to
Linux, any handles (similar to file descriptors) a process has open when forking are not
inherited by the child process by default. However, we can sidestep this issue by manually
enumerating and marking all handles as inheritable before calling fork().
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Fuzzing is a proven technique for uncovering software bugs that has enjoyed success and
attention in both industry and academia. Unfortunately, most existing fuzzing efforts are
centered around Linux systems, and can therefore only fuzz applications that support Linux
platforms. Current fuzzing efforts are also heavily focused on open-source projects. As a
result, many popular Windows applications like Adobe Photoshop or Steam have not been
thoroughly fuzzed. Thus, there are likely many “low-hanging fruit” vulnerabilities that are
waiting to be exploited, that otherwise would have been eliminated through fuzzing.
Fuzzing Windows applications is difficult. There exists a negative feedback loop, in
that Windows applications are un-fuzzed because Windows fuzzing is difficult; meanwhile,
Windows fuzzing is difficult because there has been little effort invested in it. The fundamen-
tal difficulty comes from two primary reasons: 1 the closed-source Windows ecosystem
prevalent with GUI applications, and 2 the lack of a fork-like API for efficiently cloning
processes. These two halves can be thought as two complementary problems: the harness
synthesis problem and the fuzzer implementation problem [8]. This work aims to tackle the
second problem: the lack of an effective and versatile Windows fuzzer implementation.
In this thesis, we proposed the following: 1 we introduced a new implementation
of fork() suitable for high-speed Windows application fuzzing; 2 we provided fuzzing
techniques that can overcome the challenges of fuzzing real-world, commercial software;
and 3 we implemented new instrumentation methods, sidestepping hurdles caused by
existing methods. We evaluated our fuzzer on real-world programs and found that our fork
implementation sidesteps many common fuzzing obstacles. Furthermore, comparisons with
other implementations showed that our fork implementation is competitive and well-suited
to Windows fuzzing.
21
REFERENCES
[1] B. P. Miller, L. Fredriksen, and B. So, “An empirical study of the reliability of unix
utilities,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 33, no. 12, pp. 32–44, 1990.
[2] M. Zalewski, American fuzzy lop, http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/, 2015.
[3] K. Serebryany, “Libfuzzer–a library for coverage-guided fuzz testing,” LLVM project,
2015.
[4] Google, Honggfuzz, https://github.com/google/honggfuzz, 2010.
[5] C. Aschermann, S. Schumilo, T. Blazytko, R. Gawlik, and T. Holz, “Redqueen:
Fuzzing with input-to-state correspondence.,” in Proceedings of the 2019 Annual
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), San Diego, CA, Feb.
2019.
[6] S. Schumilo, C. Aschermann, R. Gawlik, S. Schinzel, and T. Holz, “KAFL: Hardware-
assisted feedback fuzzing for OS kernels,” in Proceedings of the 26th USENIX
Security Symposium (Security), Vancouver, Canada, Aug. 2017.
[7] Google, Syzkaller: an unsupervised, coverage-guided kernel fuzzer, https://github.
com/google/syzkaller, 2018.
[8] J. Jung, S. Tong, H. Hu, J. Lim, Y. Jin, and T. Kim, “WINNIE: Fuzzing Windows
Applications with Harness Synthesis and Fast Cloning (to appear),” in Proceedings
of the 2021 Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS),
Virtual, Feb. 2021.
[9] A. Souchet, I. Fratric, J. Vazquez, and S. Denbow, AFL For Fuzzing Windows Binaries,
https://github.com/ivanfratric/winafl, 2016.
[10] S. Nagy and M. Hicks, “Full-speed Fuzzing: Reducing Fuzzing Overhead Through
Coverage-guided Tracing,” in Proceedings of the 40th IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy (Oakland), San Francisco, CA, May 2019.
[11] M. Böhme, V.-T. Pham, and A. Roychoudhury, “Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing
as Markov Chain,” in Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS), Vienna, Austria, Oct. 2016.
[12] I. Yun, S. Lee, M. Xu, Y. Jang, and T. Kim, “QSYM: A Practical Concolic Execution
Engine Tailored for Hybrid Fuzzing,” in Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security
Symposium (Security), Aug. 2020.
22
[13] Y. Wang, Z. Wu, Q. Wei, and Q. Wang, “Neufuzz: Efficient fuzzing with deep neural
network,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 36 340–36 352, 2019.
[14] M. Rajpal, W. Blum, and R. Singh, “Not all bytes are equal: Neural byte sieve for
fuzzing,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.04596, 2017.
[15] K. Böttinger, P. Godefroid, and R. Singh, “Deep reinforcement fuzzing,” in 2018
IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), IEEE, 2018, pp. 116–122.
[16] W. Xu, H. Moon, S. Kashyap, P.-N. Tseng, and T. Kim, “Fuzzing File Systems
via Two-Dimensional Input Space Exploration,” in Proceedings of the 40th IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland), San Francisco, CA, May 2019.
[17] S. Kim, M. Xu, S. Kashyap, J. Yoon, W. Xu, and T. Kim, “Finding Semantic Bugs in
File Systems with an Extensible Fuzzing Framework (to appear),” in Proceedings of
the 27th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP), Ontario, Canada,
Oct. 2019.
[18] X. Yang, Y. Chen, E. Eide, and J. Regehr, “Finding and understanding bugs in c
compilers,” in Proceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming
Language Design and Implementation (PLDI), San Jose, CA, Jun. 2011.
[19] C. Holler, K. Herzig, and A. Zeller, “Fuzzing with code fragments,” in Proceedings
of the 21st USENIX Security Symposium (Security), Bellevue, WA, Aug. 2012.
[20] W. Syndder and M. Shaver, “Building and breaking the browser,” Black Hat USA
Briefings (Black Hat USA), 2007.
[21] C. Aschermann, S. Schumilo, A. Abbasi, and T. Holz, “Ijon: Exploring deep state
spaces via fuzzing,” in 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), IEEE,
2020, pp. 1597–1612.
[22] Google, Fuzzing for Security, https://blog.chromium.org/2012/04/fuzzing- for-
security.html, 2012.
[23] ——, OSS-Fuzz - continuous fuzzing of open source software, https://github.com/
google/oss-fuzz, 2016.
[24] O. Chang, A. Arya, K. Serebryany, and J. Armour, OSS-Fuzz: Five months later, and
rewarding projects, https://opensource.googleblog.com/2017/05/oss- fuzz-five-
months-later-and.html, 2017.
[25] D. Jang and A. Askar, “FuzzCoin: A Digital Currency with Fuzzing as a Proof-of-
Work,” 2020.
23
[26] K. K. Ispoglou, D. Austin, V. Mohan, and M. Payer, “FuzzGen: Automatic Fuzzer
Generation,” in Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium (Security), Aug.
2020.
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